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Abstract—Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are widely being
adopted for safety-critical applications, e.g., healthcare and
autonomous driving. Inherently, they are considered to be highly
error-tolerant. However, recent studies have shown that hardware
faults that impact the parameters of a DNN (e.g., weights) can
have drastic impacts on its classification accuracy. In this paper,
we perform a comprehensive error resilience analysis of DNNs
subjected to hardware faults (e.g., permanent faults) in the weight
memory. The outcome of this analysis is leveraged to propose
a novel error mitigation technique which squashes the high-
intensity faulty activation values to alleviate their impact. We
achieve this by replacing the unbounded activation functions with
their clipped versions. We also present a method to systematically
define the clipping values of the activation functions that result in
increased resilience of the networks against faults. We evaluate
our technique on the AlexNet and the VGG-16 DNNs trained
for the CIFAR-10 dataset. The experimental results show that
our mitigation technique significantly improves the resilience of
the DNNs to faults. For example, the proposed technique offers
on average 68.92% improvement in the classification accuracy of
resilience-optimized VGG-16 model at 1× 10−5 fault rate, when
compared to the base network without any fault mitigation.
Index Terms—DNN, Reliability, Resilience, Fault-Tolerance,
System-Level Optimization, Error Mitigation, Machine Learning
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to their state-of-the-art accuracy in various applications,
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have become the primary
choice for most of the machine learning-based applications
[1], ranging from simpler ones like hand written digit recog-
nition to complex safety-critical applications like autonomous
driving. In general, DNNs require a significantly large number
of parameters (as shown in Fig. 1a for prominent DNNs
used for image classification) to generalize well for real-time
scenarios and, therefore, are highly computation and memory
intensive. To efficiently process data using these networks,
specialized hardware accelerators are utilized which are built
using smaller technology nodes, in order to achieve high
power and performance efficiency [2], [3], [4]. Moreover, these
accelerators make use of large on-chip and off-chip memories
to store the parameters of the DNNs.
A major concern that DNN accelerators face in the nano-
scale technologies is their reliability against faults, i.e, they
suffer from faults due to soft errors, aging and manufacturing-
induced defects [5], which can lead to catastrophic effects
in case of their usage in safety-critical applications [6]. Fig.
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Figure 1: (a) Memory consumption of state-of-the-art DNN
models. (b) The impact of hardware faults (bit flips in the
weight memory) on the classification accuracy of AlexNet.
1b illustrates our reliability analysis for the baseline AlexNet
DNN (i.e. unprotected) [7] doing image classification on the
CIFAR-10 dataset [8]. It can be noticed that the accuracy drops
significantly with growing error rates.
Anecdotally, researchers speculated that DNNs forgive hard-
ware errors [9]. But, our analysis (and other studies like [10])
has revealed that the accuracy drops even at low/nominal
fault rates. In this paper, through a comprehensive analysis,
we will show that it highly depends upon which weights are
corrupted and if they belong to the sensitive neurons or not.
In short, there is a dire need for improving the resilience of
these networks to provide reliable functionality when used with
unreliable hardware having nominal fault rates.
State-of-the-art and their Limitations: Various techniques
have been proposed to mitigate the effects of hardware-level
faults in DNN-based systems. At hardware-level, redundancy-
based fault-mitigation techniques are commonly used, e.g.,
Dual Modular Redundancy (DMR) and Triple Modular Redun-
dancy (TMR) [11] for mitigating faults in computational units,
and Error Correction Codes (ECC) [12] for error-detection
and correction in memories. In fact, the machine learning
hardware in Tesla’s self-driving cars uses expensive DMR to
mitigate the impact of faults [13]. Note that, although these
approaches offer improved resilience against faults, they have
high overheads and are not preferable for computation/memory
intensive DNNs. Other techniques include selective node hard-
ening to improve the reliability of standard logic cells [14]
and hardened SRAM-cells [15], [16]. At software-level, fault-
aware training has been introduced for mitigating the memory
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faults [17], [18]. However, there are two drawbacks of these
approaches: (1) they require access to the training dataset,
which in several real-world scenarios may not be available for
designing Inference Engines 1; and (2) retraining costs a lot of
resources and it may not be feasible to do it for every single
chip. Moreover, such solutions are only limited to design-time
faults, and cannot cope with run-time faults.
Targeted Research Problem: How to improve the re-
silience of the DNNs to hardware-level faults with minimal
energy/power and performance overhead and without the need
of training dataset, redundancy, or any costly reliability fea-
ture.
Our Novel Contributions: We address the above challenge
through the following novel contributions:
• We perform a comprehensive analysis (Section III) to
study the impacts of hardware-level faults on the accuracy
and the intermediate outputs of the DNNs. This allows
us to understand the resilience of DNNs in a systematic
way, which can enable an efficient reliability mechanism.
• Based on the analysis, we propose a clipped activation
function (Section IV) for improving the resilience of
the DNNs, which bounds the intermediate output (i.e.,
activation) values of the networks to a defined range.
• We propose a systematic methodology (Section IV) to
define the output range of the activation functions for
each layer of a DNN without the need of the training
dataset and without modifying the weights and biases of
the network.
• We present a comprehensive evaluation of the effective-
ness of our mitigation technique on the AlexNet and the
VGG-16 networks. The evaluation shows 18.19% and
69.49% improvement in the classification accuracy of
the AlexNet and the VGG-16 networks, respectively, at
5 × 10−7 fault rate compared to their baseline (without
error mitigation) variants.
II. BACKGROUND: AN OVERVIEW OF DNNS
A prominent type of DNNs is Convolutional Neural Net-
works (CNNs), which is used for processing spatially corre-
lated data, e.g., images and videos. A CNN is mainly com-
posed of two types of computational layers, i.e., convolutional
(CONV) layers and fully-connected (FC) layers, where each
computational layer is followed by an activation layer and
each CONV layer is (optionally) followed by a pooling layer.
Note that the FC layers are used for classification tasks and,
therefore, are used towards the end of the CNNs while the
CONV layers are used for extracting features and, therefore,
are placed at the start and feeds the extracted features to the
FC layers. A high-level view of the LeNet-5 network is shown
in Fig. 2. The outputs of these layers are generated by the
dot product operations between parameters and input values,
1For example, consider a DNN IP provided by a service provider, which has
to be deployed on a particular embedded hardware. The IP provider has not
made the training dataset available (as training dataset is a key IP), and one
of the system requirements is to have a defined-level of fault-tolerance which
the network (when deployed on the embedded hardware) does not meet.
C
O
N
V
-1
 
P
O
O
L
IN
G
 
C
O
N
V
-2
 
P
O
O
L
IN
G
 
F
C
-1
 
F
C
-2
 
F
C
-3
 
Input 
Output 
Fully-connected layers Convolutional layers 
6
 x
 2
8
 x
 2
8
 
1
6
 x
 1
0
 x
 1
0
 
1
 x
 1
 x
 1
2
0
  
1
 x
1
 x
 1
0
 
1
 x
 1
 x
 8
0
  
6
 x
 1
4
 x
 1
4
 
1
6
 x
 5
 x
 5
 
Figure 2: A high-level view of the LeNet-5 network
which are then passed through activation functions, e.g. ReLU,
to add non-linearity in the computations. The outputs from the
activation functions are usually referred to as activations. A
more comprehensive overview of the neural networks can be
found in [19].
III. ERROR RESILIENCE ANALYSIS OF DEEP NEURAL
NETWORKS
To analyze the error resilience of a DNN against mem-
ory faults, we developed a fault-injection framework, where
random bit-flips are injected in the memory blocks storing
the parameters of the DNN model. We perform per-layer
fault injection to study the sensitivity of individual layers
and the effects of the faults on the output activations. Fig. 3
illustrates the resilience of CONV-1 layer (first computational
layer), CONV-5 layer (fifth computational layer), and FC-1
layer (sixth computational layer) of the AlexNet. The figure
also shows the distributions of the output activations of the
respective layers.
From the analysis of Fig. 3, we draw the following key
observations:
• In general, the classification accuracy of the network
decreases with an increase in the fault rate, as shown
in Figs. 3a, 3e, and 3i. Moreover, the decrease in the
accuracy is monotonic, which is mainly because, at higher
fault rates, the probability of a fault occurring at a critical
location is significantly higher.
• At lower fault rates, the accuracy of the network stays
close to the baseline accuracy before dropping drastically,
as there is a significant chance that the faults do not occur
at critical bit locations or are masked within the network.
Also, the fault rate till which the accuracy stays close to
the baseline accuracy is different for each layer. This is
because each layer has different number of parameters
and has different number of layers between the output
and itself.
• The distribution of the output activations at higher fault
rates have values of higher-intensities as well, as can be
observed from Figs. 3c and 3d. This trend is consistent
across layers, as can also be seen in Figs. 3g, 3h, 3k,
and 3m. This is mainly because of the fact that the
weights are distributed close to zero value and bit-flips
from 0 to 1 at Most Significant Bit (MSB) locations of
the weights can result in them having higher magnitudes
and, thereby, resulting in high-intensity activations during
inference.
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Figure 3: Error resilience analysis of CONV-1 layer (a-d), CONV-5 layer (e-h), and FC-1 layer (i-l) of the AlexNet on the
CIFAR-10 dataset
IV. OUR MITIGATION TECHNIQUE FOR IMPROVING FAULT
TOLERANCE OF DEEP NEURAL NETWORKS
Fig. 4 shows an overview of our methodology for improving
the fault tolerance of DNNs using clipped activation functions.
The methodology is based on the observation made in Sec-
tion III that higher fault rates result in faulty activations with
higher magnitudes, which dominate the result and may lead
to misclassification. The proposed methodology is independent
of the training dataset and only requires a small subset of the
validation set for tuning the clipping thresholds of the clipped
activation functions. Our methodology operates in three main
steps, as discussed below.
Step-1: We perform profiling for computing the statistical
properties of the activations of all the layers using a subset of
the validation dataset. The statistics extracted from this step
are the maximum value of the activations (ACTmax) observed
at the output of each layer.
Step-2: We replace the unbounded activation functions
in the DNN with their clipped variants (explained in Sec-
tion IV-A) and initialize their thresholds with their correspond-
ing ACTmax.
Step-3: We perform fine-tuning of the clipping thresholds
using an efficient method explained in Section IV-C. The
metric used for resilience evaluation is presented in Sec-
tion IV-B. Note that Step 3 is repeated for each layer of
the network, using the network generated from Step 2, to
find suitable clipping thresholds for all the layers. The final
outcome from the methodology is a fault-tolerant DNN with
optimized thresholds for the clipped activation functions.
A. The Clipped Activation Function
Based on the observations made in Section III and following
an inspiration from the pruning [20] and the dropout [21]
techniques, we introduce a novel clipped version of the
ReLU activation function for mapping high-intensity (possibly
faulty) activation values to zero. We formulate this function
as:
f(x) =
{
x, if 0 ≤ x ≤ T
0, otherwise
Where, f(x) is the output activation, x is the input (i.e.,
output after dot-product operation), and T is the clipping
threshold beyond which all the values are considered faulty
and are mapped to zero. Although we present the clipped
version of only the ReLU function, clipped versions of other
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Figure 4: Our methodology to improve the resilience of a
pre-trained DNN model
activation functions (e.g., Leaky-ReLU) can also be designed
similarly.
B. Resilience Evaluation Metric and the Corresponding Anal-
ysis for Finding Suitable Clipping Thresholds
Evaluation metric: Hardware fault-rates can vary in a
defined range in real scenarios. Therefore, to capture the
resilience characteristics of a network across different fault
rates in a single metric, we introduce the area under the
accuracy vs. normalized fault rate curve (AUC) as a metric,
where the area is computed using the Trapezoidal rule. An
illustration of this is shown in Fig. 5a, where the area of the
region marked with blue grid represents the AUC. Note that
both the axes are normalized such that the ideal scenario, i.e.,
the case where the network provides 100% accuracy at all the
considered fault rates, has an AUC of 1.
Resilience sweep across thresholds: To study the impact of
threshold value of the clipped activation function of a layer of
a network on the resilience of the network, let us consider the
AUC vs. T curve of CONV-4 layer of the AlexNet network
trained on the CIFAR-10 dataset. The plot is shown in Fig. 5b.
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AlexNet with clipped activation in the presence of faults in
CONV-4 layer; (b) The AUC curve with various threshold
(blue line) and AUC without threshold (red line)
As can be seen from the figure, moving from higher to lower
threshold values, the AUC rises to a peak value at a particular
location before decreasing drastically. Ideally, we should select
the threshold at this location as the optimal clipping threshold
(Toptimum) of the activation functions of the layer, as it offers
the highest resilience within a pre-defined fault range. Note
that, although the blue curve in the figure seems to have a fixed
value at higher T values (i.e., at T > ACTmax), the AUC of
the network with unbounded activations is significantly low,
as shown with the help of red line in the figure. This also
reaffirms the fact that clipping high-intensity activation values
can significantly improve the overall resilience of a DNN.
C. Threshold Fine-Tuning Algorithm
The threshold fine-tuning algorithm is based on the obser-
vation made in the previous subsection that the AUC vs.
T curves always have a bell shaped curve, as also shown
in Fig. 5b. Another key observation which helped us in
designing an efficient algorithm is that the peak of the curve
always lie below the ACTmax value determined in Step 1 of
the methodology. The algorithm starts by initializing search
interval, i.e., S = [0, ACTmax], and dividing it into three
equally-sized sub-intervals, which is illustrated in Fig. 6a. The
AUCTii corresponding to the i
th boundary, at the threshold
Ti in the current search interval, is computed for each i ∈
{1, 2, 3, 4}. The region (S¯) covering the sub-interval/s around
the boundary offering maximum AUC is selected while the
rest are discarded. The search interval S is updated with S¯ and
then again divided into three equally spaced sub-intervals in
the next iteration and the same process is repeated, as shown in
Figs. 6b, 6c, and 6d. This process is applied until the number
of iterations (counter) reaches a defined number (N ), or the
maximum difference between the adjacent AUCTii s (∆j , 1 ≤
j≤ 3) is less than a predefined limit (δ) and counter ≥ M
(M < N ). The detailed algorithm is shown in Algo. 1.
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Figure 6: Threshold Fine-Tuning Algorithm applied on
CONV-4 layer of the AlexNet on CIFAR-10 dataset
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Algorithm 1: Threshold Fine-Tunning
input : Modified pre-trained DNN model from Step 2 of the proposed
methodology
output: T
1 BEGIN ALGORITHM
2 counter ← 1 ;
3 while counter ≤ N do
4 if i ==1 then
5 S ← [0 , ACTmax] ;
6 AUCT11 , AUC
T2
2 , AUC
T3
3 , AUC
T4
4 =
AUC_Calculation(S) ;
7 else
8 S, T = Interval_Search( T1, T2, T3, T4, AUC
T1
1 , AUC
T2
2 ,
AUCT33 , AUC
T4
4 ) ;
9 AUCT11 , AUC
T2
2 , AUC
T3
3 , AUC
T4
4 = AUC_Calculation(S)
;
10 counter ← counter+1 ;
11 for i = 1 to 3 do
12 ∆i ← | AUCTi+1i+1 - AUCTii |;
13 if maximum(∆1, ∆2, ∆3) ≤ δ and counter ≥ M then
14 Return T ;
15 Return T ;
16 END ALGORITHM
17 Function Interval_Search(T1, T2, T3, T4, AUCT11 , AUC
T2
2 ,
AUCT33 , AUC
T4
4 ):
18 Index ← index of T with the highest AUC
19 if Index == 4 then
20 S¯ ← [T3, T4] ;
21 else if Index == 1 then
22 S¯ ← [T1 , T2] ;
23 else
24 S¯ ← [TIndex−1, TIndex+1] ;
25 T ← TIndex ;
26 Return S¯, T ;
27 Function AUC_Calculation(S):
28 T1 ← minimum(S) ;
29 T2 ← T1 + (maximum(S) - minimum(S))/3 ;
30 T3 ← T2 + (maximum(S) - minimum(S))/3 ;
31 T4 ← maximum(S);
32 for i = 1 to 4 do
33 Evaluating model using Ti;
34 Calculating AUCTii ;
35 Return AUCT11 , AUC
T2
2 , AUC
T3
3 , AUC
T4
4 ;
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Experimental setup
We evaluated our proposed mitigation technique on two
DNNs models, i.e., the AlexNet and the VGG-16 [22]. Both
the models are modified to take the CIFAR-10 dataset images
as inputs. The AlexNet contains 5 CONV layer and 3 FC
layer while the base VGG-16 contains 13 CONV layer and
1 FC layer. The AlexNet and the VGG-16 offer baseline
classification accuracies of 72.8% and 82.8%, respectively.
We developed our fault injection framework in Python using
the Pytorch framework [23]. The developed framework is in-
line with other fault injection frameworks proposed in state-of-
the-art works, e.g., Ares in [24]. All experiments are performed
on an Intel Core i7@3.2 GHz processor with two NVIDIA
GeForce GTX 1080 Ti GPUs.
B. Comparison with the unprotected DNNs
To show the effectiveness of the proposed methodology, we
compared the accuracy of the resilient DNNs, developed using
the proposed method, with unprotected DNNs. Fig. 7a shows
the classification accuracies of the resilient and the unprotected
AlexNet. The figure clearly illustrates that the network with
clipped activation functions shows significant improvements in
the fault-resilience of the DNN at fault rates around 1× 10−7
and 1× 10−6. For example, the classification accuracy of the
resilient AlexNet with clipped activations at 5 × 10−7 fault
rate is 69.36% compared to 51.16% observed for the unpro-
tected DNN. Overall, the proposed method shows 173.32%
improvement in the AUC of the AlexNet considering the fault
range from 0 to 1×10−5. Note that the accuracies reported in
Fig. 7a are mean values computed using 50 experiments, which
is already large considering highly compute-intensive nature
of DNNs and their multiple execution runs and parameter
settings.
Figs. 7b and 7c show the variations across multiple exper-
iments using box plot. Note that at fault rates 1 × 10−8 and
5 × 10−8 the worst-case accuracy of the resilient network,
generated using the proposed methodology, is close to the
baseline accuracy (i.e., 72.8%) while the worst-case accuracy
of the unprotected network for the same fault rates is 41.93%
and 13.66%, respectively, i.e., significantly lower than the
baseline.
Similar trend is observed in case of the VGG-16 network,
as shown in Fig. 8. However, the proposed technique shows
significant improvements in the resilience of the network, e.g.,
654.91% at fault rate 5× 10−7 in AUC as can be observed
from Fig. 8a, even better than the case of the AlexNet network.
Note that for all the results reported in Figs. 7 and 8,
we employed the CIFAR-10 test set in order to avoid any
overlap between the data used for testing and the data used
for computing the thresholds.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented an analysis to study the impact of
hardware faults on the accuracy and the intermediate outputs of
the DNNs. We analyzed how high-intensity activations, gener-
ated due to the parameter corruption, result in the degradation
of the accuracy of DNN models. To mitigate the effects of
faults, we proposed a technique based on clipped activation
functions, which blocks the high-intensity (potentially faulty)
activations and maps them to zero. We also proposed an
efficient algorithm for defining the range of the clipped ac-
tivation functions. The proposed technique offers a significant
improvement in the resilience of the DNNs. For example, the
proposed technique provides 68.92% improvement at 10−5
fault rate for the VGG-16 network trained on the CIFAR-10
dataset, when compared to the unprotected network.
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Figure 7: Error resilience evaluation of the AlexNet with and without clipped activation functions
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Figure 8: Error resilience evaluation of the VGG-16 with and without clipped activation functions
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